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Abstract 
This paper describes and analyses the procurement processes employed in delivering the 
Sydney Olympic Stadium – arguably the most significant stadia project in the region 
today. 
 This current high profile project is discussed in terms of a case study into the 
procurement processes used.  Interviews, personal site visits and questionnaires were 
used to obtain information on the procurement processes used and comments on their 
application to the project.  The alternative procurement process used on this project—
Design and Construction within a Build, Own, Operate and Transfer (BOOT) project—
is likely to impact on the construction industry as a whole.  Already other projects and 
sectors are following this lead.  Based on a series of on-site interviews and 
questionnaires, a series of benefits and drawbacks to this procurement strategy are 
provided. 
 The Olympic Stadium project has also been further analysed during construction 
through a Degree of Interaction framework to determine anticipated project success.   
This analysis investigates project interaction and user satisfaction to provide a 
comparable rating.  A series of questionnaires were used to collect data to calculate the 
Degree of Interaction and User Satisfaction ratings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Major stadia projects are complex, costly and time-consuming facilities to procure.  
Each stadium project is different due to the many permutations of clients, users, funding 
options, siting and reasons for building.  Stadium Australia - Sydney’s Olympic 
Stadium - is no different.  This paper details the procurement processes employed in 
delivering the Sydney Olympic Stadium – arguably the most significant stadia project in 
the region today.  It then reports on the application of the Degree of Interaction 
framework as developed by Pocock (1996 and 1997) as a predictor of Project success. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Stadium Australia is the main venue for the 2000 Summer Olympic Games to be held in 
Sydney, Australia, and will be an integral component of the facilities in the sports 
precinct at Homebush Bay.  The stadium events will include the Games opening and 
closing ceremonies, track and field events, the finish to the marathons and the final of 
the soccer tournament.  Stadium Australia will seat 110,000 spectators for the Olympics 
and is the largest Olympic stadium ever built (BLSA, 1998a).  At this Olympic capacity 
the venue provides roof cover to approximately 59% of spectators, necessitating two 
large roof supporting trussed arches, both 295m long (BLSA, 1998b).  This initial stage 
of construction is expected to be completed by March 1999 and reach full operational 
status by the end of the first half of 1999. 
 Stadium Australia has been designed with variable geometry (movable seating 
tiers) to allow the stadium to quickly adapt from the Olympic and Paralympics athletics 
configuration to the more permanent configuration as a venue for Rugby Union, Rugby 
League, Soccer, concerts and Australian Rules Football (BLSA, 1998c).  The variable 
geometry combined with the removal of the two temporary end spectator tiers allows 
the stadium to downsize to 80,000 spectators after the Olympic events (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1.  Stadium Australia in Olympic and Post Olympic Modes. 
(Source: Bligh Voller Nield Sport) 
 
 The reconfiguration also includes the addition of the next phase of roof coverage 
over the north and south end seating areas providing roof coverage to approximately 
81% of spectators. The giant roof trusses are also designed to allow the addition of the 
third and final phase of roof coverage, a fully closing/opening section over the pitch 
area providing 100% roof coverage to spectators and the event surface (BLSA, 1998c). 
 The theme of the Sydney 2000 summer Olympics is the ‘Green Olympics’.  
Stadium Australia has been conceived as one of the most environmentally friendly 
stadia ever built (BLSA, 1998c).  The stadium is designed to recycle rain water run-off 
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for pitch irrigation, use passive ventilation where ever achievable, keep the use of PVC 
plastics to a minimum and provide as much natural light as possible. 
 
PROCUREMENT PROCESS 
The procurement process was started by the New South Wales State Government in 
1992-93 knowing that they were bidding to host the 2000 Olympic Games.  A full 
feasibility study was undertaken to determine what facilities the Government wanted 
and what facilities the Government actually needed.  The initial brief was to establish a 
‘world’s best practice’ stadium for Australia (Gilbertson, 1998).  The six month study 
was commissioned by the Homebush Bay Corporation as a steering group and assisted 
by a team of  international sub-consultants.  The feasibility team considered the stadium 
function, capacity, television interests, events, key aspects, deficiencies of other venues 
and possible revenue streams.  The initial recommendations on capacity suggested 
65,000 spectators may be feasibly sustainable.  However the Olympic brief calls for a 
minimum capacity of 80,000 spectators (Gilbertson, 1998). 
 The feasibility study concluded that the appropriate facility would cost in the order 
of A$270m with a net cost to Government, after considering revenue streams, of 
A$180m.  The New South Wales State Government required a solution to reduce their 
capital cost requirements and approached the private sector.  The Government was 
interested in a private sector solution which would deliver on time, the stadium the 
Government wanted and reduce their capital expenditure (Gilbertson, 1998).   
 The strategy was hard but simple: the Government had a site, they would issue a 30 
year lease as long as a consortium built what the Government wanted; the Government 
was not required to invest large amounts of capital; while the consortium occupied the 
site they pay the Government a nominal rent to help run the estate; and in return the 
consortium operate the new stadium.  The BOOT (Built, Own, Operate and Transfer) 
process to procure the new Olympic stadium for Sydney was edging ahead of the view 
from some sectors of Government that the stadium could be designed and built in-house 
(Henry, 1998). 
 The private sector understood fully the New South Wales State Government’s 
intention to put the new stadium out to consortia on a BOOT scheme basis.  Proponents 
began to assemble consortia of key industry players before the First Call from 
government in anticipation of some form of selection process (Whatmore, 1998). 
 
Call for Proposals 
In August 1994 the then New South Wales State Government issued a Call for 
Proposals for private sector investment in the new Olympic stadium facility (OCA, 
1997).  This call was framed around a BOOT delivery scheme with an intention for the 
Government to shortlist successful tenderers (Henry, 1998). 
 The Call for Proposals required the private sector to establish teams, identify 
finance sources and provide the Government with the confidence that their team could 
deliver the project.  The Call for Proposals documents included part of the previously 
prepared feasibility report, assessment criteria, design parameters and constraints and 
outlined the risk profile the Government required (Gilbertson, 1998; Henry, 1998; 
Whatmore, 1998). 
 
Call for Proposals Submissions 
Although the Call for Proposals documents did not require a design at this stage, most 
of the consortia did provide a concept design with serious financial solutions.  At this 
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stage it was also apparent that the indications from the financial and funding strategies, 
that close to full funding appeared be possible (Henry, 1998; Whatmore, 1998). 
 Call for Proposals submissions were submitted in October 1994 after a tender 
period of approximately three months from six different consortia (Gilbertson, 1998; 
Henry, 1998, Whatmore 1998). 
 
Call for Proposals Assessment 
In January 1995 the Government shortlisted three consortia to continue to the next stage 
after an assessment period aided by a parallel team of sub-consultants acting as advisers 
to Government (OCA, 1997; Henry, 1998).  One problem encountered in the Call for 
Proposals stage was the limited number of serious stadium operators internationally 
who would be able to manage a stadium of this nature.  This limited the number and 
quality of consortia and is seen as a possible industry weakness and may have 
disadvantages some consortia (Henry, 1998).  
 
Call for Detailed Proposals 
On 14 June 1995 the three shortlisted consortia were issued with Call for Detailed 
Proposals with an initial closing date of 11 September 1995.  These documents 
contained a detailed facility brief, background to Homebush Bay (the site), the 
prescribed submission format and a draft project agreement (Gilbertson, 1998; 
Whatmore, 1998; OCA, 1998). 
 The inclusion of the draft project agreement was designed to allow better 
negotiations.  Unusual clauses such as the Government’s right to terminate the project at 
any time without reason (with compensation) were placed in the front of the draft 
contract so they would be noticed and considered.  This up-front approach is considered 
to help avoid lengthy protracted negotiations.  All consortia were required to submit a 
marked up copy of the draft with changes they would recommend and/or seek 
(Gilbertson, 1998). 
 
Call for Detailed Proposals Submission 
During preparation of these submissions the Government organised regular weekly 
question and answer sessions where the consortiums could ask questions to the 
Government or clarify parts of the documents of policies. Questions from tenderers 
which the Government did not have an answer for were resolved within a maximum of 
one week through a direct link to the Minister.  Each question was either classified 
confidential or not confidential by OCA. If it was agreed that a particular question was 
confidential, only that consortium was given the answer.  If the question was considered 
not confidential by OCA then the question could be withdrawn or all consortia were 
given the answer.  All meetings were recorded and attended by a probity officer 
(Gilbertson, 1998; Whatmore, 1998). 
 At this stage no probable tenants had been contracted by Government to host their 
events at the stadium.  This situation led to all three consortiums negotiating in the 
market place for potential tenants (Henry, 1998). 
 A full business plan, schematic design, functional brief compliance, cost plan and 
financial structuring was prepared by all consortia for this submission.  Bids were 
practically fully written in a commercial sense at the submission stage.  This included 
identification of all sources, all credit approvals in place, all commercial conditions 
negotiated but possibly not fully documented or signed.  In reality this meant that if the 
financing or float were unsuccessful, the underwriters would be required to provide the 
required funding, hence immunising potential risk to Government (Gilbertson, 1998). 
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 One week after the submission, each consortium was required to make a 
presentation for one hour, comprising 40 minutes of presentation and 20 minutes of 
questions.  These presentations were also significant in nature directly involving up to 
40 persons from the presenting consortium and the assessment panel (Whatmore, 1998). 
 
Call for Detailed Proposals Assessment 
The assessment criteria and evaluation process were presented to all tenderers at the 
beginning of the Call for Detailed Proposals stage.  The assessment criteria, in no 
particular order, were design, ability to deliver, financial, impact on the Government 
risk profile, environment and the ability to operate as a business.  Each criteria was 
weighted and scored out of 10.  The weightings and relative scores were not made 
public.  The numerical assessment was used as a guide.  However a particularly low 
score in any of the assessment criteria was fatal.  The numerical assessment process did 
appear to eventually produce a clear winner from the consortia (Gilbertson, 1998). 
 The Government assessment team consisted of a two-level process.  The first level 
of detailed analysis of the proposals involved an Assessment Committee assisted by a 
team of expert sub-consultant advisers.  Each member of this committee read every 
document submitted and scored each proposal on all assessment criteria.  The 
Assessment Committee of two to four OCA personnel also worked with a team of 
independent advisers on a day-to-day basis. 
 A full-time probity officer was also assigned to the Assessment Committee.  The 
role involved establishing the probity procedures and monitoring that they were 
working, attending all critical meetings (most were critical) and resolving any breaches 
in probity.  This process included a written methodology for document control.  This 
project started with six tenderers.  Because this is a big project, with big risks, big 
prestige and big capable companies from the private sector, the assessment process 
needed to be rigorous, transparent and thorough (Gilbertson, 1998). 
 The Assessment Committee developed their own financial models of each 
consortium’s proposal to enable a level of comparison and sensitivity testing.  A 
benchmark design was also developed by the independent advisers.  This alternative 
design was used to benchmark and access the proposals and provide a safety net to 
Government if the three shortlisted consortia failed to deliver adequate proposals.  
Although this benchmark design was completed before the Call for Detailed Proposals, 
it was however never issued to the three consortia (Gilbertson, 1998; Henry, 1998).  The 
Government advisers attempted to offer alternative design solutions to the tenderers.  
However due to the benchmark design never being released their efforts were frustrated 
because their drawn solution could not be shown to the consortia and only verbal 
suggestions were made (Whatmore, 1998). 
 During the assessment period the regular question and answer sessions used 
previously during the submission stage were continued.  This time however the 
Government (or OCA) asked the questions to the consortia to understand and clarify 
their bids (Gilbertson, 1998). 
 Even though three tenderers were still active until the announcement of the 
preferred proponent, the Assessment Committee had gathered all the information they 
required on the third proposal within two months and concentrated on the final two 
proposals.  These two proposals were close at this stage and a further clarification stage 
was required to remove any ‘murkiness’.  The process was widened to allowed the two 
teams to improve their offer if they felt so inclined.  During this period the conditions of 
the proposals were reviewed in detail and the proponents were asked to consider 
removing any commercial conditions which the Assessment Committee did not like. At 
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the end of the assessment process one proposal was clearly ahead of the others and a 
recommendation was made (Gilbertson, 1998).  Probity and legal officers were both 
required signed off on the final assessment. 
 The Executive Review and Evaluation Committee then reported directly to the 
Minister of the Olympics. The Olympic Subcommittee of NSW Cabinet approved the 
recommendations in January 1996 to enter into negotiations with the then named 
Australia Stadium 2000 Consortium as the preferred proponent to build, finance and 
operate the Sydney Olympic Stadium (OCA, 1998). 
 
Preferred Proponent 
The announcement of the Preferred Proponent started a long and intense negotiation 
period.  This involved all the commercial issues being locked away and the prospectus 
for the public float of memberships was developed and approved.  The architectural 
advisers to the Government were engaged for the six months during the negotiation 
period and attempted to influence the design, relatively unsuccessfully. 
 A debriefing to the other two proponents occurred.  This process was intended to 
explain the assessment process and demonstrate this transparency, explain the strengths 
and weaknesses of their proposal in terms of the assessment criteria and was strictly not 
debated.  The debriefing panel included two personnel from OCA, the probity officer 
and whoever from the consortium wished to attend (Gilbertson, 1998). 
 
Signed Agreement – The Team 
The negotiated Project Agreement for the design, construction, financing, operation and 
maintenance of the stadium was signed on 16 September 1996.  The agreement is 
between OCA and the Perpetual Trustee Company Limited and permits and obliges the 
trustee to: 
 Finance, plan, design, construct and commission Stadium Australia in its 
“Stage 1” mode, plus fitout for the Olympics, apart from certain works to be 
undertaken for and financed by the OCA under contracts…; 
 Procure the operation, maintenance and repair of the stadium during the 
term of the Land Lease from the OCA to the Trustee (i.e. from the 
completion of Stage 1 until 31 January 2031 or any earlier termination of 
the agreement); 
 Make the stadium available to SOCOG for the Olympic Games, the 
Paralympics and earlier “test” events, as set out in other contracts…; 
 Reconfigure the stadium after the Paralympics to its long-term (“Stage 2”) 
mode; and 
 Yield up possession of the stadium to the OCA on 31 January 2031 or an 
earlier termination of the agreement. 
(OCA, 1998, p 13) 
 The Perpetual Trustee Company Limited has entered into a Head Contract Design 
and Construct Agreement with Obayashi which assigns all responsibility for the 
trustee’s obligations within the Project Agreement for most of the design, construction 
and fitout of the stadium.  Obayashi has then sub-contracted its design and construction 
responsibilities to Multiplex Constructions under the head contract through the 
Multiplex Design and Construction Agreement (OCA, 1998).  In this process Obayashi 
is the guarantor that Multiplex can complete the Design and Construct Contract.  If 
Multiplex fails, Obayashi is responsible to complete the works.  In order to ensure 
Multiplex’s progress Obayashi require all deadlines be met one month before they are 
contractually due (Whatmore, 1998). 
 7
 Tower Hill Investment Managers manage the Stadium Australia Trust on behalf of 
the Stadium Australia Consortium.  Their role is to ensure the contractor builds what 
they are contracted to build.  This role extends through until 2001 when A$30m will be 
spent to reconfigure the stadium into the post-Olympic ‘Stage 2’ mode. Tower Hill 
Investment Managers in turn appointed their own sub-consultant to oversee compliance 
of what is built to what has been documented (Zagami, 1998). 
 After the signing of the Project Agreement, many other agreements were 
immediately signed.  There are approximately 180 agreements on the Stadium Australia 
project, 60-80 core agreements and the rest are signed letters (Gilbertson, 1998).  
Multiplex started on site immediately after the signing of the Project Agreement and 
other directly relevant agreements (Whatmore, 1998). Refer Figure 3. 
 
Funding 
The funding of the project is complex and multi-stranded.  Table 1 indicates the 
proposed finance sources. 
 
 
Table 1.  Sources of Funding for Stadium Australia 
 
Funding Source Amount (A$)
Interest, income, rent and other operational cash flows (over 30 years) $15.3m * 
Hire purchase and suppliers’ fitout $38.2m 
Debt funding from OCA $6m * 
OCA capital funding for stadium construction and conversion components of 
“OCA works” 
$72m ** 
OCA capital funding for stadium precinct component of “OCA works” $19.2m ** 
Term debt funding from ANZ Bank $125m 
Equity from “commercial investors” (Gardner Merchant, Ogden IFC, Coca-
Cola Amatil) 
$21.5m 
Equity from “project sponsors” (“founders”) (Multiplex, Hambros, 
Macquarie, Obayashi) 
$18.6m 
Loan by project Trustee to project Operator of funds raised from “Platinum 
Membership” subscribers 
$5.7m 
“Platinum Membership” subscribers’ equity investments $9.9m 
“Gold Membership” subscribers’ equity investments $283.8m 
Estimated total project cost $615.2 m 
* Estimate only. OCA loan may be up to $9 m.  ** Subject to escalation provisions of contract. 
(OCA, 1997) 
 
 Of the Government contribution through OCA of $91.2 m, only approximately 
$19.2m is for the design, construction and post-Paralympic reconfiguration of the 
stadium precinct (OCA, 1997).  This finance was channelled at specific building 
elements rather than into the general pool of money.  OCA in effect paid for the two 
main roof trusses and the external works (Zagami, 1998).  It is also interesting to note 
that the government contributions could have been less.  However it was decided that 
the private funds would be expended first and the Government funds last.  Hence on the 
standard calculations of the value of a sum of money in the future compared to the value 
of the sum of money at present values, the Government financed more in order to pay in 
the future (Gilbertson, 1998).  
 In addition to the funding sources listed above, the Government received $65.0m 
from the sale of Olympic ticket rights to Gold Membership and Platinum Membership 
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investors and from the underwriters.  However these proceeds are not available to help 
finance the construction of the stadium (OCA, 1997).  The Government also negotiated 
competitive protection for Stadium Australia to minimise their financial contribution up 
front.  This involved compensation of other venues for loss of events which they would 
have already sold in packages (Gilbertson, 1998). 
 
Construction 
During the construction period the Government believed they had a right to make 
wholesale changes to the design through their independent advisers.  The man-hours 
lost in this process to effect minimal changes appears significant in relation to the 
design consultant fees.  This loss has been estimated at three Architects working full-
time for one year.  The financial drain from this process is obvious, however less 
obvious was that these key peoples’ expertise was removed from the continuing 
process.  It has been suggested that this process delayed and frustrated the project 
(Zagami, 1998; Whatmore, 1998). 
 During the construction process OCA observed and investigated the works as 
required.  Tower Hill Investment Managers followed OCA’s investigations to act as the 
buffer between OCA and the Design and Construct contractor.  This allowed the 
contractor to get on with the job and not delay progress. 
 The site as inspected on 24 September 1998 was approximately six to seven months 
from final completion expected on 1 March 1999.  Should the contractor not meet this 
milestone, severe liquidated damages of approximately A$135,000 per day become due  
(Whatmore, 1998). 
 If the stadium is built in the manner that it was contracted, then OCA are obliged to 
give the consortium a lease on the land for the pre-defined term.  The OCA input then 
drops away quickly and the stadium owners begin to operate as a business.  They have 
30 years to recoup their capital expenditure and turn a profit. 
 
Figure 2.  Stadium Australia Overall Construction Progress, February 1999 
(Source: Bligh Voller Nield Sport) 
 
Discussion and Comments 
Many comments were made during the interviews for this case study.  The first issue 
that became very obvious was that everybody had a different view due to the varying 
 9
circumstances of  financial control, attitude, needs and experiences.  Many different 
stakeholders were involved with this project with many in competition (Henry, 1998). 
 The process so far has been described as complicated, professional, expensive, 
tedious and exciting.  The BOOT process is relatively new in Australia compared with 
other procurement methods.  This project is considered by many to be the first BOOT 
scheme used for a major publicly-used building (Whatmore, 1998).  BOOT projects can 
be extremely document intensive, process intensive, legally intensive and expensive to 
all parties.  However a successful BOOT process can save tens of millions of dollars 
(Gilbertson, 1998).  Estimates for the tendering, assessment and negotiation periods, for 
this project passed A$30m before the facility construction had started (Whatmore, 
1998). 
 Issues of control and risk were commented upon regularly.  It has been suggested 
that the Government had some control over the project, however this was only through 
the functional briefing requirements rather than the aesthetics of design.  However with 
this level of control the commensurate level of responsibility did not follow.  Members 
of the winning consortium felt that there was far too much control by the Government 
for not enough financial risk – almost all risk lay with the consortium.  However the 
Government had to let some control of the project go to encourage innovative proposals 
through the BOOT process.  This process did not necessarily give the people of New 
South Wales’s control over what the building would contain due to commercial 
realities.  The Government did however pay more attention to this project than on a 
normal civil infrastructure BOOT project due to the public nature of the building 
(Gilbertson, 1998). 
 The consortium was in virtual full control of construction timing, while the 
Government only had a few milestones with significant liquidated damages to guide the 
process (Henry, 1998).  This also enabled the consortium to control cost to a large 
extent.  The enormous financial risk incurred to the consortium created adversarial 
relationships on the project between stakeholders (OCA, SOCOG and all the consortium 
equity members).  These complex client relationships also were seen as difficult for 
consortium members to come to terms with (Buckland, 1998). 
 The series of complex relationships required a Design and Construct contractor that 
was flexile enough to adapt to the situation.  The project also required a lot of flying by 
the seat of your pants approach due to the enormous budgets and short period of 
construction time (A$463m in two years).  The Design and Construct process within the 
BOOT scheme has lead to a lot of interaction between designers and constructors and 
enabled a partnering philosophy (Zagami, 1998). 
 It has been commented that there has never been a clearly defined pathway through 
the project, and that this has been a significant public relations exercise to get the 
project to where it is now (Zagami, 1998). 
 Mistakes or lost opportunities in the process have been suggested through the 
interview process: 
 It was considered that the Government should have negotiated with the tenants 
before the consortia were required to develop their bids; 
 It has been suggested that the Project Agreement was not tied up sufficiently to 
protect the interests of the equity investors; and 
 The parallel team of architectural advisers possibly created more delays and 
stoppages than benefits - but it was useful to have a public watchdog process. 
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DEGREE OF INTERACTION  
The Stadium Australia procurement process has been analysed by the authors through 
quantitative and qualitative methods to determine an anticipated level of project success 
through evaluating the Degree of Interaction (DOI).   This analysis allows this 
international standard project and procurement process to be evaluated against other 
projects through a common framework.  This DOI framework  was developed by 
Pocock et al. (1996 and 1997) to measure interaction and its effect on project 
performance in a quantifiable approach.  The  DOI framework is processed on a project 
basis through a system of weighted interaction for each project phase.  The DOI has 
been categorised as: 
… the extent of interaction among designers, builders, and project team 
members during a project’s planning, conceptual design, detailed design, 
procurement, construction and start-up phases (Pocock et al., 1997, p63). 
 The DOI framework has been tested on 38 military construction projects in the 
USA through historical data on project performance based on cost growth, schedule 
growth, the number of modifications and the percent of modifications based on design 
deficiencies.  These project performance factors have been directly linked to the 
Sanvido (et al., 1992) Critical Project Success Factors (Pocock et al., 1997).  The direct 
relationship between DOI and project performance (or success) has been verified 
through scatter diagrams and regression analysis (Pocock et al., 1996 and 1997). 
 The framework has been developed to include User Satisfaction ratings as a 
secondary measure.  User satisfaction ratings have been used successfully in relation to 
project quality by Fergusson and Teicholz (1993), which reinforces this approach.  The 
framework was further developed through statistical analysis to allow the prediction of a 
project’s likely performance of success.  This process can be used to anticipate the 
likely level of project success, based on project performance indicators, of a project 
which has not yet begun or one which is in progress (Pocock et al., 1997). 
 Through the application of this framework on the Stadium Australia project during 
the construction phase, the resultant DOI score (of 0.65) suggests that the project will 
have a high level of project success as defined in the Pocock framework (Magub, 1998).  
The overall DOI score of 0.65 indicates with 95% confidence intervals that the project 
will have less cost growth, less schedule growth, less modifications and less 
modifications due to design deficiencies of a project with a structure which does not 
encourage the same level of project interaction (DOI score below 0.4).  Table 2 
illustrates the advantages which this project has been projected to achieve based on the 
Pocock framework. 
 
Table 2.  Anticipated Project Performance (Based on DOI) 
 
Performance/Success indicators Impact of DOI score above 0.4 compared 
to a project with a DOI score below 0.4 
Cost growth (%) 27% less 
Schedule growth (%) 62% less 
Number of modifications 50% less 
Modifications due to design deficiencies 58% less 
(Pocock et al., 1997, p 73) 
 
 Through administering questionnaires, the resultant User Satisfaction rating 
reinforces the relationship of the DOI score to the anticipated User Satisfaction 
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demonstrated by Pocock.  The final User Satisfaction rating of 7.1 sits at the upper limit 
of the DOI below 0.4 range and at the bottom of the DOI above 0.4 range.  Graphically 
the 7.1 result follows the trend demonstrated in the Pocock scatter plot diagrams.  Table 
3 illustrates the anticipated improvements in user satisfaction over a project with a DOI 
score of below 0.4. 
 
Table 3.  Anticipated Project Performance (Based on User Satisfaction) 
 
Performance/Success indicators Impact of DOI score above 0.4 compared 
with a project with a DOI score below 0.4 
User satisfaction (1-10) 21% higher 
(Pocock et al. 1997, p 73) 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Stadium Australia BOOT procurement process has rated highly on the DOI and 
User Satisfaction analysis (0.65 and 7.1 respectively).  This procurement process 
involves high levels of interaction on the project team which has directly increased the 
anticipated project success levels.  The relatively high User Satisfaction Rating confirms 
the anticipated success levels for this project.  The procurement process has been further 
analysed quantitatively in terms of the beneficial, neutral and non-beneficial 
components by dissecting the individual components (Magub, 1998).  
 The Stadium Australia project has been intentionally procured as a BOOT (Build 
Own Operate and Transfer) project.  However within the BOOT project framework, the 
actual construction works have been procured as a Design and Construct process.  This 
process appears to have provided a number of benefits to the project: 
 Increased funding levels from the private sector; 
 Increased commitment from the consortium members through equity positions; 
 Increased project interaction, not only by designers and builders, but the entire 
project team; 
 A fixed cost construction component through the Design and Construct contract; 
 Increased level of innovation from the project team due to the competitive nature of 
the initial bid; and 
 Increased levels of ‘team work’ approach from the design and construction team 
through constant interaction from pre bid, through to completion. 
(Magub, 1998) 
 This process appears to have also provided a number of disadvantages to the 
project: 
 Extremely complex contractual and legal structures; 
 Complex client structure; 
 Extremely high bid costs; 
 Lengthy bid process; 
 Complex assessment process; 
 Large commitments of time and resources from the client; 
 Adversarial relationships between competing stakeholders (for example OCA and 
the consortium funding providers); and 
 Less control by client. 
(Magub, 1998) 
 12
 The overall time for the entire project has been estimated at 72 months or six years 
from initial feasibility to operational status.  This extensive project time fame when 
compared to other similar projects may be due to a number of factors including: 
 Double tender process (Call for Proposals and Call for Detailed Proposals); 
 Length of the  Proposals preparation periods; 
 Length of the Assessment period due to each proposal submitting a full scheme, 
including design, business plan, operational plan and financial models; and 
 Length of the Preferred Proponent negotiation period. 
(Magub, 1998) 
 The alternative procurement process used on this project—Design and Construct 
within a Build, Own, Operate and Transfer (BOOT) project—is likely to impact on the 
construction industry as a whole.  Already other projects and sectors, including health  
are following this lead. 
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